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Abstract Rail traffic is controlled by operators working in
multiple control centres. Although each of these control
centres enjoy quite some autonomy and authority, their
activities are highly interdependent. This is especially the
case during the management of disruptions. In this study,
we look at the role of leader teams with system-wide
responsibilities and the task of synchronizing the control
centres’ activities. Research on leadership in this multiteam
setting of networked control centres, which operate in a
dynamic and time-compressed environment, is limited.
Hence, this study explores the behaviours and functions of
these leader teams during the management of two large-
scale disruptions in the Dutch railway system. We will
show how various factors influence the ability to provide
leadership within this specific real-world context. This
study demonstrates that combining insights from the liter-
ature on multiteam systems and resilience engineering can
contribute to our knowledge of the critical challenges of
control in polycentric adaptive systems.
Keywords Railway  Complex systems  Disruption
management  Polycentric control  Teamwork  Leadership
behaviours
1 Introduction
The Dutch railway network is one of the busiest in Europe in
terms of rail traffic. It is also technically complex, due to its
high number of switches, double tracks, and associated sig-
nalling (ProRail 2011). This makes it highly vulnerable to
disruptions. Disruptions are an event or a series of events that
lead to substantial deviations from planned operations (Niel-
sen 2011). These disruptions result in growing dissatisfaction
among travellers, extra expenses, and revenue losses. Con-
sequently, responding to disturbances in a timely manner in
order to restore services rapidly has become an important
objective. To do so, operators must assess the nature and state
of the disruption and adjust operations before it becomes
impossible to control (Johansson and Hollnagel 2007). Under
the influence of restructuring policies, the Dutch railway
system has undergone major changes over the past decades,
resulting in the separation of infrastructure management and
rail operations activities. This has turned disruption manage-
ment into an inter-organizational challenge (De Bruijne and
Van Eeten 2007; Schulman and Roe 2007).
Railway disruption management involves the reschedul-
ing of three interdependent key resources: (1) rail infra
capacity, which is managed by ProRail, the infrastructure
manager (2) train crew, and (3) rolling stock, which is
managed by the train operating companies (TOC).1 Control
of these key resources is distributed among the multiple,
geographically separated control centres of both organiza-
tions, all of which enjoy partial autonomy and have the
authority to adapt plans. The tight coupling between
resources makes disruption management a complex puzzle
and requires control centres to work closely together.
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Coordination can be achieved through predefined plans and
procedures, but given the dynamic and uncertain environ-
ment in which operators work, real-time adaptation of plans
is often necessary (Johansson and Hollnagel 2007). In
practice, situations during a disruption often changed faster
than the involved parties could communicate and the
decentralized control made it difficult to manage disruptions
with a national impact (Goodwin et al. 2012).
This is why ProRail and Dutch Railways established a
joint Operational Control Centre Rail (OCCR) in 2010. The
co-location of both parties was intended to encourage com-
munication and coordination in order to reduce recovery
time during disruptions. In the OCCR, ProRail and Dutch
Railways monitor railway traffic at a national level and can
intervene in local operations when necessary. This makes it
possible to synchronize adaptation by the different local
control centres, while safeguarding the ability of local
operators to quickly respond to small disruptions. In the lit-
erature, this kind of control has been termed polycentric
control (Branlat andWoods 2010;Woods andBranlat 2010).
Polycentric control seeks to sustain a dynamic balance
between the two layers of control—those closer to the basic
processes with a narrower field of view and scope and those
farther removed with a wider field of view and scope—as
situations evolve and priorities change.
Nevertheless, this kind of large-scale coordination is not
easy when working in a complex and dynamic environment
(Ritter et al. 2007). It also depends on how geographically
and organizationally separated teams carry out their roles
and manage interdependencies across the different levels of
control (Johansson and Hollnagel 2007; Woods and Branlat
2010). During the past year, there have been several large-
scale disruptions in the Dutch railway system where the
situation became ‘out of control’ and no one really knew
what was going on or what should be done. Effective
leadership is thus important to orchestrate the actions of the
multiple teams involved in the management of a disruption
(DeChurch et al. 2011). The number of studies on leader-
ship in multiteam systems—operating in non-routine and
dynamic environments—is however very limited, and
multiteam system research is a relatively new field of
research based primarily on laboratory research (Zaccaro
and DeChurch 2012). As such, much can be learned about
how leadership processes manifest themselves and influ-
ence the adaptation process in a real-world context.
In this paper, we are interested in the role of leadership
behaviours of the OCCR during the management of large-
scale disruptions. This leads us to the following research
question:
How do leader teams in the OCCR provide leadership
during the management of disruptions and which
challenges affect their leadership?
To answer this research question, we have analysed the
management of two large disruptions. Before we introduce
these cases, we will first take a closer look at the devel-
opment of the OCCR and its established role and respon-
sibilities in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we will look at adaptation in
a multiteam system and the role of leadership. This section
provides a framework for studying leadership behaviours.
The methods are described in Sect. 4, followed by brief
case descriptions in Sect. 5. The results of the study are
provided in Sect. 6 and discussed in Sect. 7. The conclu-
sions are presented in Sect. 8.
2 Disruption management in the Dutch rail system
The establishment of the OCCR has created a structure
with two layers of control on a regional and national levels
(see Fig. 1). ProRail currently has thirteen regional traffic
control centres that are responsible for the railway traffic in
specified geographical areas. ProRail controls and monitors
all the train movements, and its traffic controllers assign
paths to all TOCs. Regional traffic controllers monitor the
railway traffic in their designated areas and optimize traffic
flows. In addition, train dispatchers are responsible for the
safe allocation of railway tracks on the sections assigned to
them. Similarly, Dutch Railways has five regional opera-
tions control centres that monitor railway traffic and
manage train crew and rolling stock schedules. Operators
of ProRail and Dutch Railways in the OCCR also monitor
traffic and operations on a national level. They coordinate
the activities of the different regional operators and regu-
late shared resources, such as rolling stock. Secondly, the
creation of the OCCR means that many parties involved in
the management of railway disruptions who used to be
physically separated are now co-located. They not only
include ProRail’s traffic control and Dutch Railways’
operations control, but also teams responsible for Incident
Management, Asset Management and contractors.
If a disruption occurs, ProRail’s train dispatchers and
regional traffic controllers assess its impact on rail traffic.
Only the train dispatchers have real-time information on
the position of trains and therefore play a central role in the
communications with people at the location of the incident
(Schipper et al. 2015). A notification with details on the
disruption is placed in the communication system (ISVL)
by the Back Office, which can be accessed by most parties
in the rail system. During this first phase of the disruption
management process, the regional control centres of Pro-
Rail and Dutch Railways take the lead to prevent the dis-
ruption from propagating. Nevertheless, the operators in
the OCCR have the authority to overrule all decisions made
by the regional control centres. The regional traffic con-
troller will then share an overview of the remaining rail
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infrastructure capacity with the national traffic control and
operations control in the OCCR. The national traffic con-
troller will check if this distribution of the remaining
capacity does not negatively impact other regions. National
traffic controllers have a global overview of traffic flows
using time–distance diagrams. A contingency plan is then
selected, together with Dutch Railways’ network opera-
tions controllers. These predefined plans contain alternative
timetables for the most common disruptions. Before the
contingency plan is implemented, a final check with the
regional control centres is made to check feasibility, e.g.
whether train drivers are available to operate trains. The
implementation of the contingency plan initiates the second
phase of the disruption management process in which
recovery of the rail infrastructure commences. Once rail
capacity is fully recovered, rail services are fully restored,
this being the third phase.2
3 Leadership in a multiteam system
The adaptive capacity of complex systems has been found
to depend on the balance between the distribution of
authority and autonomy across local control centres and the
capacity to avoid a fragmented response to disruptions
(Woods and Branlat 2011a, b; Woods and Shattuck 2000).
In the literature on resilience engineering, the answer to
this trade-off is sought in polycentric control (Branlat and
Woods 2010; Ostrom 1999; Woods and Branlat 2010).
Polycentric control seeks to sustain a dynamic balance
between local and distant centres of control, as they are in a
constant interplay as situations evolve and as a result of
activities and progress at each centre (Branlat and Woods
2010). Although research is building up on polycentric
control, still little is known about its workings and how a
dynamic balance should be maintained between both layers
of control. As mentioned in the introduction, managing the
interactions of the control centres (both horizontally and
vertically) is not an easy task. It requires multiple teams
working at different locations and with different organi-
zational backgrounds, goals, and responsibilities to effec-
tively align their activities.
There is a growing body of literature on these so-called
multiteam systems (MTS), i.e. networks of distinct yet
interdependent (component) teams that address highly
complex and dynamic environments (Shuffler et al. 2014;
Zaccaro et al. 2012). MTS are officially defined as: ‘two or
more teams that interface directly and interdependently in
response to environmental contingencies toward the
accomplishment of collective goals’ (Mathieu et al. 2001:
290). Contrary to most of the studies on teamwork, which
focus on individuals within a single team, MTS research
looks at how multiple teams function to grasp the unique
opportunities, challenges, and complexities of these sys-
tems (Marks et al. 2005). For instance, although teams
might be effective at within-team coordination, the system
itself may still fail to adapt to a disruption, due to an
inability to meet between-team coordination requirements
(Luciano et al. 2015). MTS research has stressed the
importance of leader teams (e.g. representatives of the
component teams), situated hierarchically above the com-
ponent teams, who have system-wide responsibilities and
Fig. 1 Different roles involved
in the traffic management and
their lines of communication
2 For a more detailed description of the disruption management
process, see Schipper et al. (2015).
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the task of managing the interdependencies among com-
ponent teams (Davison et al. 2012). Studies have shown
that effective leadership has a positive influence on inter-
team coordination and overall MTS performance (e.g.
DeChurch and Marks 2006; DeChurch et al. 2011). It is
therefore important to look at the behaviour of these
leaders in the adaptation process of a MTS (Zaccaro and
DeChurch 2012).
Location, timing, and the type and severity of the incident
will all influence the adaptation process and the capacity of the
system to adjust operations before it becomes impossible to
control (Golightly et al. 2013). The way in which operators
respond to a disruption (both individually and as a team) will
also be context specific, depending on individual character-
istics such as experience, knowledge, andflexibility (Maynard
et al. 2015). Nevertheless, Burke et al. (2006) argue that each
team adaptation follows a cyclical process consisting of four
phases: (a) situation assessment, (b) plan formulation, (c) plan
execution, and (d) learning. In this study, we will look at the
first three phases. In their model, Burke and colleagues stress
the importance of teamwork competencies, such as mutual
monitoring, communication, backup behaviour, and leader-
ship during the phase of plan execution.We believe that these
teamwork competencies are also important in MTS settings,
but argue (and will show later in the paper) that they are not
only important during plan execution, but also during the
phases of situation assessment and plan formulation.
First of all, adaptation requires the ability to quickly
recognize cues that signal the need for adaptive actions.
However, as Uitdewilligen and Waller (2012) observe,
since there are many component teams in a MTS, situation
assessment will be highly distributed, and therefore, the
situation awareness of teams will also be distributed. In
order to create a compatible understanding of the situation
between teams, it is essential to share crucial information.
Exchanging appropriate information and providing each
other with regular updates helps to maintain a compatible
situation awareness of the dynamic environment to ensure
coordinated behaviour. MTS leaders can facilitate com-
munication and the timely and accurate exchange of
information between component teams to maintain situa-
tion awareness. Moreover, during moments of stress,
component team members might not be able to uphold an
awareness of the system (Uitdewilligen and Waller 2012).
Leader teams can act as an information hub in order to
create an overall understanding of the operational envi-
ronment and potential future development trajectories of
the system. The latter is important to formulate a plan or
pick a contingency plan that brings the MTS’s capabilities,
resources, and actions into line with the emergent dynamics
in the operating environment. The quality of this plan
depends on how well it fosters and maintains this align-
ment (Zaccaro and DeChurch 2012).
Leader teams also have an important role in monitoring
the performance of component teams in terms of their
progress towards system level goals (Zaccaro and
DeChurch 2012). For example, leader teams can provide
feedback in the form of verbal suggestions or corrective
behaviours in the event of errors or performance discrep-
ancies (Marks et al. 2001). Component team members may
also struggle to perform their tasks due to a high workload.
In this case, leader teams can provide backup behaviour by
prompting other component teams to provide help, by
shifting workload to other teams, or by proactively offering
help with specific tasks. Finally, given the dynamic envi-
ronment in which MTSs operate, it is crucial that this is
continuously monitored, both internally (status and needs
of teams) and externally (environmental conditions)
(Marks et al. 2001). If unexpected changes occur within an
MTS’s performance environment and the contingency plan
no longer seems appropriate, it must be decided whether to
reconsider, abandon, or adjust the original plan (ibid.).
Leader teams play an important role in monitoring the
system, identifying impending and actual blockages to goal
accomplishment, and perhaps adapting the course of action
when necessary (Zaccaro and DeChurch 2012).
In Table 1, we have summarized the above-mentioned
leadership functions and provided behavioural markers.
Behavioural markers are descriptions of, in this particular
case, observable leadership behaviours (Dietz et al. 2015).
Some of the markers have been adopted from theory on
individual teams. We have translated these markers to
make them suitable for the multiteam context of our study.
Leadership behaviours are assumed to have an important
influence on the relationship between the adaptation pro-
cess and outcome (Maynard et al. 2015; Zaccaro and
DeChurch 2012). However, it is difficult to quantify and
compare outcomes given the unique characteristics of
disruptions and their contexts. We therefore relate leader-
ship to system performance by its ability to secure the
adaptive capacity of the system. Woods and Branlat
(2011a, b) have identified three basic patterns of adaptive
failure in complex systems: (a) decompensation, (b) work-
ing at cross-purposes, and (c) getting stuck in outdated
behaviours. These patterns can eventually lead to a system
breakdown and thus need to be avoided or recognized and
escaped from. Decompensation occurs when disruptions
grow and cascade faster than operators can respond. In this
case, the capacity of operators to maintain control can
suddenly collapse and the capacity of the system to respond
to immediate demands might be lost. Secondly, working at
cross-purposes is the result of a lack of coordination
between the different control centres (both horizontally and
vertically) and results in conflicting goals that undermine
the system’s over-arching goals. The last pattern is at play
when people hold on to initial assessments of situations and
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lack the capacity to revise plans as conditions change. As a
result, the tactics or strategies chosen do not match the
actual challenges and so there is a risk of failure to adapt.
In this study, we look at the adaption process in two
cases, with an emphasis on the communication and coor-
dination processes between the teams in the OCCR and the
teams in the local control centres. We are especially
interested in whether and how leadership behaviours are
applied to prevent or correct the system from falling into
one of the three maladaptive traps (see Fig. 2).
4 Methods
4.1 Case selection
To examine the leadership of leader teams in the OCCR,
two cases of large impact disruptions were studied. These
disruptions were selected because of their non-routine
characteristics and the rapidly changing environmental
conditions, factors that increase the risk of adaptive failures
and therefore necessitate effective leadership. In case 1, we
examined leadership during a winter storm that challenged
the ability of local operators to stay in control. In case 2,
we studied the management of a broken overhead wire at
the largest train station in the Netherlands. Following
Woods and Cook (2006), these cases do not serve as
examples of successful or unsuccessful adaptation, but we
believe that they are valuable for revealing patterns in
teamwork and leadership behaviours in a naturalistic
environment.
Many teams are involved in the management of dis-
ruptions, each with their own tasks and responsibilities. For
instance, the ability to swiftly recover from a disruption
depends greatly upon how quickly maintenance teams are
able to repair rail infrastructure. As the focus of this study
is on the leadership of leader teams in the OCCR, we have
focused our analysis on the interactions between ProRail’s
local and national traffic control teams and Dutch Rail-
ways’ local and national operations control teams.
4.2 Data collection
To examine the leadership of the leader teams in the
OCCR, ProRail provided access to recordings of 102
telephone conversations between national and regional
Table 1 Important components of effective leadership and their behavioural markers
Component Description Behavioural markers References
Communication Managing communications about team actions
and goal progress across all component teams
The leader teams gather information about the
MTS’s performance environment to create a
‘big picture’ understanding
The leader teams manage the flows of
information between component teams to
facilitate the timely and accurate exchange
of information
DeChurch et al. (2011),
Zaccaro and DeChurch
(2012)
Performance
monitoring
The ability to develop a shared awareness of
the teams’ environment and the strategies
used to maintain an awareness of component
teams’ performance
Leader teams monitor goal progress and goal
blockages
Feedback regarding component team actions is
provided to facilitate self-correction
Alonso and Dunleavy
(2013, Salas et al. 2005,
Zaccaro and DeChurch
(2012)
Backup
behaviour
Knowing how and when to back up teams and
team members. This includes the ability to
shift workload among teams to achieve
balance during periods of high workload
Leader teams recognize that there is a
workload distribution problem within
component teams
Leader teams prompt
component teams to provide back up and
helping behaviour to other teams and to shift
work to underutilized teams
Leader teams proactively assist component
teams with task work
Salas et al. (2005, Wilson
et al. (2007), Zaccaro
and DeChurch (2012)
Decision
making
Decision making refers to the leader team’s
ability to determine goals; develop plans and
strategies for task accomplishment; identify
contingencies, and to alter/update a course of
action in response to changing conditions
Leader teams develop and share alternative
plans for collective action in response to
anticipated changes in the performance
environment
Leader teams remain vigilant to changes in the
internal and external environment
Strategies and plans are adjusted to
unanticipated changes in the performance
environment
Dietz et al. (2015, Marks
et al. (2001), Salas et al.
(2005), Wilson et al.
(2007)
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traffic controllers during both disruptions. Unfortunately,
Dutch Railways was unable to provide us with their
recordings of the telephone conversations between their
operators in the OCCR and the local control centres.
However, a large number of documents were obtained from
both ProRail and Dutch Railways. We examined shift
reports written by operators involved in managing the
disruptions from both organizations, event reports on both
disruptions, and the communication system logs. In addi-
tion to this, the winter storm case was evaluated internally
by ProRail and Dutch Railways. This evaluation report
includes a careful examination of the communication
between ProRail’s national and regional traffic controllers.
This extensive evaluation report was used as complemen-
tary data. For the broken overhead wire case, we conducted
our own evaluation, which includes 9 interviews with
operators directly involved in the management of the dis-
ruption. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed.
The evaluation was presented to a group of managers from
ProRail and Dutch Railways for expert feedback on the
findings. Finally, 10 follow-up interviews were held with
managers and operators to clarify events and leadership
behaviours. As some of the interviews with operators were
held during their shift, it was not possible to tape-record
them. Instead, detailed notes were taken of those inter-
views. All other interviews were recorded and transcribed.
4.3 Data analysis
The telephone conversations (102 in total) were transcribed
and then coded to capture the leadership behaviours. The
software programme ATLAS.ti was used to systematically
code the data. Instead of the more common quantitative
approach of measuring behavioural markers as a frequency
or on a scale, a qualitative approach was chosen, which
involved labelling the leadership functions. Pieces of the
telephone conversations were labelled according to the
markers (Table 1) provided for the leadership functions.
For instance, if a national traffic controller informed a
regional traffic controller that he would be rerouting
international trains, this piece of conversation was coded as
proactively assisting component teams. This qualitative
approach made it possible to provide a rich description of
leadership behaviours and challenges to leadership on the
basis of a systematic analysis. The telephone conversations
were also used to identify indicators for the three adaptive
traps. The latter may, for instance, be a request for help, if
an operator is at risk of losing the capacity to adapt. In the
second step, we used our additional data to complement
our initial findings, identify patterns in the behaviours of
the leader teams, and relate this behaviour to the three
adaptive traps.
5 Case descriptions
Before we move on to the results of our study, we will first
give a brief description of both cases. A more detailed
timeline of the events in both cases is provided in Tables 2
and 3.
Case 1 Winter storm
The first case happened during a winter’s day in 2014.
Around 5:30 a.m., a massive snow storm caused numerous
malfunctions to switches and guarded crossings in the
southern part of the Netherlands. This region is managed
by two regional traffic control centres, Eindhoven and
Roosendaal. Within 2 h, twenty-six malfunctions had been
reported. Prior to the storm, cuts to the rail service had been
made to add some slack to the system. Nonetheless, due to
diminishing rail capacity, regional traffic controllers and
Fig. 2 Analytical framework
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train dispatchers struggled to keep rail traffic flowing.
Around 09:15, the regional traffic controller in Eindhoven
temporarily stopped all rail traffic to get an overview of the
situation and regain control. This came as quite a surprise
to the operators in the OCCR as they were unaware of the
severity of the situation. Around 11 a.m., the regional
traffic control centres regained control and rail service was
gradually restored. However, it took another 6 h to get the
rail service completely up and running due to the limited
availability of train crew and rolling stock.
Case 2 Broken overhead wire
Early on a Monday morning in 2015, a train broke an
overhead wire upon entering Utrecht Central Station, the
largest and most important station in the Netherlands.
Power was automatically taken off the overhead system in
the vicinity of the broken wire, depriving six platform
tracks and two rail tracks of power. Normally, it is possible
to restore power to non-affected groups remotely, but due
to construction work at the train station, groups had been
rearranged and the power had to be restored manually. This
made it difficult for the train dispatchers and regional
traffic controllers to estimate the available rail capacity,
and so, it took almost one and a half hours to implement a
contingency plan. Despite this contingency plan, train
dispatchers and regional traffic controllers kept struggling
to keep the rail traffic flowing as there was often no crew
on the trains. With all platform tracks occupied, trains were
queuing up to enter Utrecht Central Station. The overhead
wire was repaired around noon, but it took several more
hours to fully restore train services.
6 Results
In this section, we will show how different leadership
behaviours manifested themselves during the management
of the disruptions. To structure the description of our
findings, we use the three basic patterns of adaptive failure
to see whether or not and how the different leadership
behaviours were used to prevent or correct the system from
falling in one of the three traps.
6.1 Decompensation
The pattern of decompensation can be observed in both
cases. For example, in the winter storm case, local opera-
tors of ProRail were confronted with cascading failures as
the snow caused more and more malfunctions to switches
and level crossings. As a result, operators were quickly
running behind the tempo of events. For instance, due to
problems with crossing barriers, train dispatchers had to
give verbal instructions to each train driver in order for a
Table 2 Main events in the first case: winter storm
05:26–06:00 The train dispatchers are automatically notified of a malfunction in two guarded crossings
06:29–07:27 A total of 26 guarded crossings and switches show malfunctions. This means that a lot of trains have to be rerouted over other
tracks and train dispatchers have to give verbal instructions to train drivers at the crossings. This results in serious delays and
crowded stations
07:17 The national traffic controller makes a routine call to the regional traffic controller in Eindhoven. The situation is discussed, but no
decisions are made on further actions
07:33 The regional traffic controller in Eindhoven calls the national traffic control for help, but the national traffic controller asks the
regional traffic controller to make a logging in the communication system of the remaining rail capacity
07:36 Regional controllers of ProRail and NS start to cancel trains
07:48 National and regional traffic control in Eindhoven discuss the operational conditions, but again no decisions are made on further
actions
07:59 Despite a code red, the regional traffic controller in Roosendaal starts his shift at 08:00 as if it is a regular day. Up until that
moment, his area of control was being monitored by the regional traffic controller in Eindhoven. He immediately gives a
situation update to the national traffic control and highlights the seriousness of the situation. No concrete decisions are made
08:21 The regional traffic controller in Roosendaal warns the national traffic controller that he has lost sight of the overall picture. The
national traffic controller promises to discuss matters with NS
08:27 The regional traffic controller in Roosendaal again warns that he is losing control and has to stop most of the train services to
regain sight of the overall picture. Help is offered by the national traffic controller, but declined. There is no further mutual
consultation
09:15 The regional traffic controller in Eindhoven tells the national traffic control that they are losing control and suggests stopping all
trains in the south of the Netherlands. The national traffic controller promises to consult the other parties in the OCCR
09:19 The regional traffic controller in Eindhoven informs the national traffic controller that he has stopped all train services in his area
of control
09:30 The OCCR decides to stop train services in the control areas of Eindhoven and Roosendaal
17:00 Train services are restored
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train to pass a level crossing. These verbal instructions
greatly increased their workload and caused severe delays
to the train services. These delays and the loss of rail
capacity made it very difficult for the regional traffic
controllers to keep the rail traffic running. For the local
operators of Dutch Railways, updating the crew schedules
became quite a bottleneck during both disruptions. Since
last-minute changes to the crew schedule must be
announced by phone, the communication workload
increased rapidly and operators struggled to get in contact
with the train crews. Hence, there were too few operators to
manage all the anomalies and the overview of the train
crew was soon lost, as one of the coordinators of Dutch
Railways (LBC) explains:
LBC: If you have one or two phone calls on paper,
but not in the system, you are lost. A thousand people
will start to phone you and they all just want one
thing: they want to know what they should do and if
they will be back on time at the end of their shift.
As a result, trains often could not depart because there
was no crew assigned to them. With the platforms still
being occupied, arriving trains could not enter the sta-
tions. This caused a further escalation of the situation and
an increase in workload, since train drivers and conduc-
tors on the trains queued outside the station had to be
rescheduled.
6.1.1 Backup behaviour by leader teams
To solve the above-mentioned deadlock and to prevent
local controllers from completely losing control, the
coordinator of Dutch Railways in the OCCR decided to
switch to the highest emergency situation (code red
M3 ? P3) during both disruptions. This ‘code red’ proce-
dure is designed get more and better control over the
rescheduling of train crew. This procedure involves several
measures. First of all, management tables were placed at
the largest stations. This basically meant that all crew
members arriving at the station had to report to this table to
be registered. Registration at these tables enables local
operators to update the systems and to re-assign crew to
trains. Secondly, the coordinators of Dutch Railways
decided to redistribute the rescheduling of the crew on
long-distance trains among the other local control centres
and operators in the OCCR. In addition, operators in the
OCCR took over the management of the rolling stock, so
additional capacity at the regional control centres became
available for the rescheduling of train crew. Nevertheless,
as both cases have shown, it took quite some time to fully
regain control and sometimes it was even easier to just wait
until the next shift of train crew and start with a clean sheet.
Likewise, although they were not acting according to a
formalized procedure, we noticed that ProRail’s national
traffic controllers proactively assisted the regional traffic
Table 3 Main events in the second case: broken overhead wire
05:56 Upon entering Utrecht train station sparks are noticed upon the roof of train 80408 and the train is stopped immediately
05:56 Power is lost on the overhead wires at platforms 9–14. Two trains are unable to move and block additional platforms
06:13 The train dispatcher is informed that a contact wire has been found on top of the roof of train 80408 and that power has to be restored
manually. Mechanics are sent to the site
06:18 The regional traffic controller in Utrecht warns the national traffic controller that the situation is more severe than anticipated
06:40 Regional control centre gives an initial estimation of remaining rail capacity
07:13 NS issues a code red to remain control over the train crew
07:18 The first contingency plan has been formulated by the OCCR and is checked with regional control centres. Regional traffic controller
Utrecht demands additional cuts
07:23 Power is mostly restored, except for platforms 9, 10, and 11
07:40 The contingency plan is accepted by all regional control centres and implemented
07:50 Platform tracks remain occupied since many of the trains do not have a crew to operate them. Trains are queuing up to enter Utrecht
Central Station. The regional traffic controller in Utrecht decides to make additional provisional cuts
07:52 The regional traffic controller in Rotterdam informs the national traffic controller about the provisional cuts and that NS is dissatisfied
about regional traffic control in Utrecht deviating from the contingency plan
07:59 The national traffic controller and regional traffic control in Utrecht decide to hold on to these provisional cuts until 09:00 instead of
making changes to the contingency plan
09:00 The OCCR decides to revise the contingency plan as the management of train crew remains troublesome
10:45 Repair work on the overhead wire is started
12:06 Repair works are finished and all rail infrastructure is back in service
12:30 NS develops a plan to restore its rail services
15:33 All train services have been restored
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controllers by rerouting international and cargo trains;
updating the communication system (ISVL) with details on
the disruption and verbal agreements; arranging locomo-
tives to tow-stranded trains and cleaning up the timetables.
The latter is a task that is easily shed during periods of high
workload.
6.1.2 Performance monitoring and recognizing workload
problems
However, the cases also show that operators in the OCCR
struggle to determine if local operators are exhausting their
capacity to adapt and backup needs to be provided. Since
national traffic controllers only have a general overview of
the traffic flows, they are not able to determine the seri-
ousness of local situations by means of the traffic control
systems. Hence, it is important to have regular contact with
local operators to monitor their performance. Yet, as the
overhead wire case clearly showed, national traffic con-
trollers increasingly struggled to contact regional traffic
controllers in order to create a shared understanding and
discuss the need for backup. Besides, national traffic con-
trollers often passively waited to be called for help instead
of proactively offering assistance. However, in the tele-
phone conversations we only once identified a clear request
for assistance by a regional traffic controller and sometimes
the help offered was rejected even through the operators
were faced with a huge workload. This greatly increases
the risk of intervening when the capacity to adapt has
already been lost.
As Branlat and Woods (2010) observe, it is important to
detect a developing problem at an early stage to be able to
respond and avoid a decompensation collapse. The key
information then is how hard operators are working to stay
in control. In both cases, it was noticed that little time and
effort was invested in discussing the performance of the
regional control centres and potential future risks. For
example, in the winter storm case the information being
shared between the regional and national traffic controller
mainly concerned an enumeration of all the malfunctions.
Despite the fact that the network traffic controller
acknowledged the seriousness of the situation at an early
stage, they were unable to translate this information to a
shared understanding of the impact of all the malfunctions
on the train service and the local operators’ ability to stay
in control. Hence, the national traffic controller was una-
ware that the regional traffic controllers were nearing their
capacity limits.
Moreover, even when there are clear signals that local
operators are struggling to stay in control, operators in the
OCCR do not always recognize the seriousness of the sit-
uation and immediately respond to these signals. For
example, in the winter storm case the regional traffic
controller specifically asked for help, but the national
traffic controller responded by asking the regional traffic
controller to first make a logging of the remaining rail
capacity in the communication system. So, instead of dis-
cussing the operational situation by phone, the national
traffic controller had to make sense of the situation with the
help of a simple text message. He therefore missed
important contextual information. This reliance on com-
munication systems to monitor the performance of the local
control centres entails other risks. Due to the high work-
load, local operators were often unable to update the sys-
tem with new information on disturbances and verbal
agreements. Hence, operators in the OCCR might have
made sense of the operational situation on the basis of
outdated or incomplete information. Furthermore, the lack
of new information in the communication system might
falsely give the impression that everything is under control.
6.2 Working at cross-purposes
Contingency plans form an important coordination mech-
anism in the Dutch railway system as they tell operators of
ProRail and Dutch Railways which trains should be can-
celled and when and where trains should be short-turned.
However, before a contingency plan can be implemented
the disrupted area first has to be isolated to prevent con-
gestion and a propagation of the disruption to other areas.
The workload of local operators can really peak during this
first phase of the disruption management process, espe-
cially if the disruption occurs at a major station, as in the
second case, and trains have to be shunted and a lot of
rescheduling work has to be done. Moreover, coordinating
activities requires a great deal of dialogue between the
control centres. For instance, the regional traffic controller
has to warn neighbouring traffic controllers about the sit-
uation and order them to stop trains from moving to the
affected area. ProRail’s regional traffic controller also has
to consult with the regional monitor of Dutch Railways to
decide where trains should be short-turned and what should
be done with the trains stranded in the disrupted area.
Hence, this first phase of the disruption management pro-
cess is characterized by local improvization and little
control over the situation by the OCCR. A national traffic
controller outlines the situation in the broken overhead
wire case:
NTC: We don’t have a contingency plan ready, but
they (local control centres) are very active in short-
turning trains. They are very busy at all locations, but
how exactly and what they are precisely doing, I
don’t know. They are still writing everything down.
However, during both cases it was noticed that infor-
mation is often no longer shared properly during stressful
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situations as people tend to focus on their own task. For
example, regional traffic controllers often told the national
traffic control that they experienced updating and reading
the messages in the communication system as an admin-
istrative burden, which had lower priority then trying to
keep traffic flowing. Moreover, telephone lines quickly got
overloaded and communication flows crumbled due to the
large flow of direct communication between operators.
This caused control centres to work at cross-purposes, as
teams acted on the basis of incomplete information and
faulty assumptions. In the second case, for instance,
neighbouring traffic control centres were unaware of the
difficulties that operators in the disrupted area were expe-
riencing in keeping the traffic flowing. Neighbouring traffic
controllers therefore kept sending trains to the disrupted
area. As a result, trains were queuing up before the station,
which made it more difficult to isolate the disrupted area
and halt the spread of the disruption to other areas. Simi-
larly, Dutch Railways’ local control rooms started to make
use of each other’s resources, such as train personnel,
without consultation. There were also instances in which
train drivers were relying on (incorrect) information from
ProRail’s train dispatchers, as they could not get in contact
with their own organization.
6.2.1 Orchestrating action and managing the flows
of communication
The OCCR has the important task of developing an overall
understanding of operational conditions. To create this
overall understanding, the coordinators of the different
teams co-located in the OCCR regularly come together to
share and discuss the information received from local
operators and decide on a shared course of action. The
various parties then inform the local operators of the
decisions that have been made to orchestrate their activi-
ties. However, as we have observed, especially in the
broken overhead wire case, the overall understanding of the
situation created by the coordinators in the OCCR can
quickly become outdated, as one of the national coordi-
nators rail (LCR) explains:
LCR: What you repeatedly see is that we are running
behind the facts here in the OCCR. What often hap-
pens is that we are discussing things that are already
outdated. So, while we are creating a shared under-
standing, the situation outside has already changed
completely.
Hence, it is important that local operators provide reg-
ular situation updates so that the operators in the OCCR
can update their overall understanding of the situation.
Despite this, we noticed that these big picture updates were
very scarce. Instead, the operators in the OCCR had to
actively collect the information themselves. This was made
difficult by the overloaded telephone lines. In fact, in the
broken overhead wire case, a pattern emerged in which
neighbouring traffic control centres were actually provid-
ing the national traffic controllers with important new
information when they contacted them for guidance.
This information disadvantage negatively influenced the
OCCR’s ability to monitor performance and take control
when needed. First of all, since decision making by the
coordinators in the OCCR was based on already outdated
information, their decisions were often no longer feasible
and new rounds of decision making had to be started. As a
result, the role of the OCCR became reactive, instead of
proactive. Moreover, the development of a collective
understanding on the basis of new information takes quite
some time. This conflicts with local operators’ need for a
quick decision in order to intervene quickly in the esca-
lating situation. For example, in the winter storm case the
regional traffic controller single-handedly decided to stop
the rail traffic in his area of control while the operators in
the OCCR were still discussing newly obtained information
on the situation outside. If this decision had been coordi-
nated better, it might have had less of an impact on the
management of the train crew and services could have been
restored sooner. Finally, instead of being a hub for infor-
mation collection and dissemination, we noticed that local
control centres often bypassed the OCCR for information
and consultation. Instead, they sought direct contact with
the local operators managing the disruption in order to
receive firsthand information. This is illustrated by the
following fragment of a conversation between a regional
traffic controller and national traffic controller.
RTC: I will discuss matters with Utrecht. Not to be
rude, but I prefer to listen to Utrecht instead of you,
because with them I have a shorter line of commu-
nication (…) If you tell me that they will be able to
manage things and the regional traffic controller over
there says he is not, then I will run into problems with
them.
At Dutch Railways, they try to solve issues with the
synchronization between and with the local control rooms
by scheduling regular conference calls with their shift
leaders to obtain periodic situation updates. In addition, the
coordinator at Dutch Railways in the OCCR can make use
of four ‘cards’ (punctuality, control, large traffic flows and
rolling stock) that are assigned to each control centre
matching the operational environment. These cards indi-
cate the priorities for each control area and provide
guidelines for achieving these goals. For instance, during
these major disruptions the coordinator assigned the ‘con-
trol card’ (preventing the propagation of disruptions) to all
regional control rooms in order to shift to a clear chain of
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command in which there should be no discussion about
decisions made by the operators in the OCCR. Neverthe-
less, applying these cards are not without their difficulties
when it is necessary to make a trade-off between the goals
of carrying passengers and achieving a balance in the
rolling stock, as one of the coordinators of Dutch Railways
(LBC) explains:
LBC: A chain of command starts with good
agreements and communication and there you have
it… Good communication is often difficult because
you can’t get into contact with each other. I’m also
convinced that not everyone fully understands what
these cards actually mean. You should actually do
a check. We are currently playing the ‘rolling
stock’ card, but do you know what that means? It
means that I can cancel a passenger train to free up
a train driver, because rolling stock has first pri-
ority. There should be no discussion then about the
fact that the train is full with passengers and that
cancelling the train will lead to a crowded
platform.
6.3 Getting stuck in outdated behaviour
The success of the Dutch disruption management model
largely depends upon the capacity of local operators to
make a correct situation assessment quickly so that a
contingency plan can be implemented that matches oper-
ational conditions. In a time-compressed and dynamic
environment the availability of information needed to make
an accurate assessment of the situation is however often
challenging, while decisions have to be made quickly to
prevent the situation from escalating (Salas et al. 2001).
Regional traffic controllers normally deal with this issue by
relying on their experience. In other words, they anticipate
that a situation will unfold according to earlier experiences
and start to manage the disruption in line with the antici-
pated contingency plan, (cf. Schipper et al. 2015). This is
not an easy task, however, when disruptions are cascading,
as in the first case, or when operators are confronted with a
new and complex situation, as in the second case. In those
cases, understanding of the situation often needs to be
adjusted on the basis of new insights (Uitdewilligen and
Waller 2012). In the broken overhead wire case, this led to
a tension between the desire to implement a contingency
plan and the need to remain vigilant to changes in the
environment.
6.3.1 Plan formulation and remaining vigilant to changes
in the environment
The previous section highlighted the risks of managing a
disruption without a shared plan. To reduce these risks,
operators in the OCCR tried to formulate and implement a
contingency plan as soon as possible. Hence, national
traffic controllers urged regional traffic controllers to
quickly make an assessment of the remaining infrastructure
capacity. However, train dispatchers and regional traffic
controllers found it difficult to make an accurate assess-
ment of the complex and evolving situations, either
because there was still a lot unknown or because any
assessment of the situation was soon outdated. For exam-
ple, in the broken overhead wire case it took quite some
time to investigate the break in the overhead wire and
restore power to the overhead lines, while in the winter
storm case the number of malfunctions reached a total of
26 within an hour. Moreover, in both cases we observed
that regional traffic controllers struggled to divide their
attention between making a situation assessment and
keeping the traffic flowing to prevent a propagation of the
disruption. They often preferred to focus on to the latter.
In the second case, the implementation of a contingency
plan was further delayed because the unique circumstances
meant that predefined plans were not applicable. Hence,
plans had to be adjusted by hand to the specific circum-
stances, which is a time-consuming task. In the meantime,
the situation deteriorated rapidly. Local operators of Dutch
Railways were struggling to assign crew members to trains,
platform tracks were kept occupied, and trains were
queuing up in front of the station. Consequently, the issue
was no longer just a loss of infrastructure capacity due to
the broken overhead wire as operators struggled to keep
control over all resources. Hence, the alternative service
plan being implemented no longer matched operational
conditions. In fact, the OCCR’s desire to swiftly move on
to the plan execution phase conflicted with the capacity
limits of the local operators, as one of the team leaders of
the regional traffic control rooms explains:
Team Leader: When they (OCCR) want to imple-
ment a contingency plan, which in my view happens
more often, we are still in the first phase of managing
the disruption. Dealing with the shunting of trains so
we can get an overview of the situation and to see
what is still possible. At that point, there is already a
logging in ISVL that we will operate according to this
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contingency plan. When that logging was made we
had seven trains waiting for a red signal! (…) I
believe that there has been a check, but the desire of
National Traffic Control (to quickly implement the
contingency plan) and what we could manage in
practice, didn’t match.
6.3.2 Adjusting plans to unexpected changes
in environment
The national traffic controller had indeed checked with the
regional traffic controllers whether they thought the alter-
native service plan could be implemented. Although the
regional traffic controllers agreed with the plan, they soon
had to revise their judgement and make additional cuts to the
train service. Therewas actually quite some doubt among the
national traffic controllers as to whether the regional traffic
controllers had made an accurate assessment of the available
capacity and if the contingency plan could be implemented.
This concern was never fully expressed to the regional traffic
controllers nor did they take the time to jointly make a good
assessment of the situation in order to detect anymistakes. In
fact, the operators of ProRail and Dutch Railways in the
OCCR decided not to significantly adjust the plans, but to
hold on to the chosen contingency plan in order to create
stability and to re-assess the situation later on to see if
additional measures were needed.
Nevertheless, in this case the contingency plan did not
lead to a stable train service as there was not enough
capacity to run all the trains according to the alternative
service plan. Instead of stability, incremental adjustments
had to be made to the contingency plan to match it to the
changing conditions. This kind of re-planning is not with-
out risks. Not only does it lead to unreliable information for
passengers, since trains are cancelled at last-minute notice,
but it also causes confusion among the control centres.
Revising a plan requires a great deal of renewed coordi-
nation between the different control centres and increases
their communicative burden and workload. This makes the
decision to revise a plan in progress difficult and highlights
the importance of making an accurate assessment of the
situation. In practice though, operators in the Dutch railway
system (at both levels of control) often tend to simplify
conditions and make a positive estimation of the possibil-
ities to run trains, as a travel information employee (MRI)
explains:
MRI: What you could witness here was the classical
rail spasm, which you see often, to say let’s try and
see what happens (…) The problem is that you are
totally unpredictable for the passengers. At best you
are predictable in terms of underperformance (…) I
wonder if we would have had the same problems if
we had made bigger cuts to the train service. Then
afterwards, we could have seen what was still pos-
sible and if there was room for more. Now we make
initial cuts in the train service and start to clean up the
mess. However, the mess doesn’t become any smaller
and we still have to make additional cuts.
7 Discussion
The analysis of these two large-scale disruptions has shown
that leadership is not an easy task in a MTS adapting under
stress and that adaptive failures form a serious threat to the
system. In Table 4, the barriers to leadership, as found in
the previous section, have been summarized and contrasted
with the markers from Table 1. The main findings will be
discussed in the next section.
First of all, we have seen that decompensation is a
serious issue in the Dutch railway system during large-
scale disruptions, as local operators were falling behind the
tempo of events. To avoid this maladaptive trap, it is
important that workload distribution problems are noticed
quickly and that workload is redistributed or assistance is
offered proactively. We observed two specific issues in
providing backup behaviour regarding backup provision
and requesting and accepting backup. First of all, operators
in the OCCR often struggled to adequately monitor the
performance of local operators in order to detect whether
they might need backup and how this should be provided.
Besides performance monitoring, it is therefore important
that the local operators themselves indicate that they need
assistance and that help is accepted when needed.
However, when confronted with increasing demands,
local operators are not always able to recognize and express
their need for assistance. As Smith-Jentsch et al. (2009)
notice, backup providers and recipients will weigh up the
likely costs and benefits of coordinating backup prior to
offering it or requesting it. The interviews revealed that
regional traffic controllers often refuse help because they
prefer to manage things on their own. There is a fear among
regional traffic controllers of relinquishing control over their
process and risking losing sight of the overall picture in their
own region. Moreover, some regional traffic controllers
actually believe that asking for help is a sign of weakness.
Studies have shown that factors like trust, team orientation,
and the experience of working together have a positive effect
on offering and requesting backup (Fiore et al. 2003; Smith-
Jentsch et al. 2009). However, given the setting of distributed
teams and continuously changing team compositions, it can
be expected that these factors will be less developed and that
requests for assistance will be context specific, as one of the
traffic coordinators of ProRail describes:
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Traffic coordinator: It strongly depends on who is
on the other side of the phone. A good regional traffic
controller knows when to hand things over, instead of
wanting to do everything themselves. If I call them
and tell them, I will call your colleague, or I will take
over this part of your work, they shouldn’t mind.
Secondly, the telephone conversations revealed that
signals of backup needs were not always recognized by the
operators in the OCCR as a legitimate need for help. This is
partly due to the fact that the information shared was so
detailed that the operators in the OCCR were unable to
grasp the core message. This shows that just sharing
information about the situation at hand is not enough, but
that it needs to be translated into meaningful information
for others. However, the telephone conversations also
showed that operators in the OCCR regularly failed to ask
for clarification of the information received in order to
create a shared understanding of the situation. The inter-
views revealed that operators in the OCCR are often
hesitant to cross-check information out of the fear of
intervening in the work of the local operators.
Another key issue we identified was the information gap
of the teams in the OCCR during the management of the
disruptions. We expected the OCCR to have an overall
understanding of the situation during the disruptions in
order to orchestrate the activities of the local control cen-
tres. On the contrary, we noticed that the OCCR quickly
had a degraded or outdated situation awareness due to the
amount of information that had to be shared between
teams, inadequate communication lines, and the pace at
which the environment changed during the disruptions.
This shows that effective leadership is not just the result of
the actions of the leader teams, but that component teams
play a critical role in facilitating the performance of leader
teams by maintaining their situation awareness (Salmon
et al. 2008). As such, component teams should be aware of
the kind of information the leader teams need and provide
regular updates, something which is easily neglected when
confronted with a high workload.
Finally, this study has revealed important tensions
between coordination by plan and the need to remain
vigilant to changes. Research has shown that the adapt-
ability of teams depends on the speed with which envi-
ronmental changes are recognized and appropriate
responses are enacted (Burke et al. 2006). However, local
control centres need to contain the disruption and make an
accurate situation assessment simultaneously. As the cases
illustrate, it is not always easy to do the latter. The local
operators were nevertheless under pressure from the OCCR
to quickly move to the implementation of a contingency
plan. The broken overhead wire case showed that situation
assessment and plan execution are thus not always strictly
separated steps, but these activities actually overlapped and
even conflicted. It resulted in an oversimplification of
conditions and in the end the need to revise the contingency
plan. Hence, disruption management is not always a single,
linear process, but may involve several rounds of assess-
ment, rectification, and adjustment of plans (Golightly
Table 4 Summary of the barriers to leadership observed in the cases
Component Observed barriers to leadership
Communication Local operators often gave preference to immediate task performance instead of providing regular big picture updates to
the OCCR or updating the communication system
Operators in the OCCR were quickly running behind the facts due to the dynamics of the operational environment and
communication difficulties
The information provided to the national traffic controllers was often full of details, making it difficult for them to grasp
the core message
Local control centres bypassed the teams in the OCCR for consultation due to their degraded situation awareness
Performance
monitoring
Leader teams did not always take the time to cross-check information with the sender to create a shared understanding of
the operational environment
Leader teams did not always express their doubts regarding the actions of local operators
Backup behaviour Leader teams did not always recognize signals as a legitimate need for help
National traffic controllers passively waited for a request for help
National traffic controllers struggled to proactively provide assistance, due to the lack of communication with local
operators
Local operators rarely asked for help and sometimes refused the help offered
Decision making Local operators struggled to divide their attention between situation assessment and immediate task performance
Leader teams focused on quickly implementing a standard contingency plan despite changes within the internal and
external environment
Leader teams struggled to decide between holding on to an initial assessment and revising plans in progress
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et al. 2013). This creates an important challenge for oper-
ators in the OCCR, who have to decide between holding on
to an initial assessment and revising a plan in progress, the
latter involves a great deal of renewed coordination
between the teams involved in the disruption management
process.
8 Conclusion
While most studies have focused on the contribution of
leadership to the adaptation of single teams, leadership in a
multiteam setting poses additional challenges. Both in
theory (with the development of the concept of polycentric
control) and practice (with the development of the OCCR),
there is a strong belief that complex networks of control
centres—which pursue their own sub-goals and operate in a
dynamic and turbulent environment—need a higher level
of control to coordinate their activities. The main aim of
this study was to further investigate the role of MTS
leadership in a real-world setting. We therefore examined
the role of leader teams in the management of two large-
scale disruptions. This study has shown that operators in
the OCCR experienced difficulties in recognizing workload
problems before local operators lost capacity to control the
situation; were confronted with an outdated situation
awareness when coordinating activities of the local control
centres, and tended to oversimplify conditions in order to
swiftly implement standard contingency plans.
The challenges to MTS leadership identified in this
study show that it cannot be expected that polycentric
control will instantly occur, simply by placing a leader
team above the component teams. Leadership in a MTS
requires effective teamwork between component and lea-
der teams in which the component teams should actually
facilitate the leader teams in their role. This requires
specific interventions, such as joint training sessions, in
order to gain a better understanding of how other teams
function and to improve communication and coordination
skills (Wilson et al. 2005).
Naturally, we are aware of the limitations of our study.
The two case studies analysed show the behaviour of a
specific group of operators dealing with a specific disrup-
tion. It is therefore difficult to generalize the insights of this
study, although we must point out that these findings are
embedded in broader longitudinal research. As such, a
larger body of knowledge on the management of disrup-
tions has been collected over a three-year period through
many hours of observations at the different control centres,
interviews with operators, and by studying evaluation
reports on other disruptions. Hence, the detailed descrip-
tions of the findings from these two cases are embedded in
a broader understanding of disruption management in the
Dutch railway system and the behaviour of operators at
both levels of control.
With this research, we have shown some of the diffi-
culties of providing leadership in a MTS. We believe,
however, that leadership is important in relation to MTS
effectiveness. We therefore need further empirical research
on leadership in various multiteam systems to increase our
understanding of the unique challenges of leadership pro-
cesses in MTS and how to deal with them. In addition, in
this study we have not focused on leadership behaviours
prior and subsequent to the management of a disruption,
but these transition phases can be of importance to the
effectiveness of leadership during the management of dis-
ruptions. Moreover, the coordination between the different
leader teams in the OCCR fell outside the scope of this
study, but poses an interesting challenge in terms of bal-
ancing the needs of one’s own team or organization and
that of the system as a whole. Future research on these
topics could help our understanding of leadership in a
MTS.
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